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INTRODUCTION

In Misaligned Lawmaking,1 Timothy Meyer identifies a major

problem in U.S. trade law design. Professor Meyer argues that there is
a misalignment between trade liberalization laws-laws that enable
the executive branch to lower trade barriers with other countries-and
trade adjustment assistance laws-laws that provide financial help to
workers displaced by competition with new imports. 2 This
misalignment is the result of differences in the processes, nature,
timing, and perceived impact of these two sets of laws, which were made
separate beginning in 1962.3 But all is not lost. The present moment,
Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Tim Meyer
for the opportunity to respond to his Article. My thanks to Harlan Cohen and Simon Lester for
comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also to the Vanderbilt Law Reuiew student editors, and
particularly Micah Bradley, for their invitation and engagement.
1.
Timothy Meyer, Misaligned Lawmaking, 73 VAND. L. REV. 151 (2020) [hereinafter
MisalignedLawmaking].
2.
Id. at 154-55.
3.
Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 [hereinafter 1962 Act]
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (2018)).
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Professor Meyer tells us, is a critical juncture for correcting this
misalignment. 4

I fully agree with Professor Meyer in both respects. Trade
lawmaking in the United States suffers from some serious
misalignments, and not just with respect to trade adjustment
assistance. Those misalignments are largely the product of complexities
in our separation of trade law powers. Congress has the constitutional
prerogative on foreign commerce but is ill-equipped to manage everyday

trade decisions and negotiations with foreign trading partners.
Consequently, our trade law walks a delicate line between flexible
programmatic delegations to the executive and congressional
maintenance of authority. Crafting that relationship effectively is a
task of immense proportions. Our current approach is functional but
flawed.
Now could be a decisive moment for reconsideration. A
conversation about how to (re-)design the institutions that dominate
trade policy is underway. But that project could just as easily
exacerbate the misalignments and other shortcomings in our
institutional design. Looking at trade law more generally, this
Response argues that misalignments like those thoughtfully and
importantly elaborated by Professor Meyer constitute one of three
principal institutional difficulties with our trade law system as
presently framed. In addition to a general degree of disorganization and
misalignment, U.S. trade law suffers also from challenges in finding
and defining its contours, and from challenges in responding to
economic dynamism. This Response briefly lays out these adversities,
contextualizing Professor Meyer's important contribution in broader

trade strokes. 5
In the first Part of this Response, I take up trade law's obscurity
and circumscription: the wide web and resulting indeterminacy of what
constitutes the field. Trade law's indefinite boundaries make it difficult
to find and treat as a unit, but also difficult to avoid, and that
uncertainty directly affects its governance. Misalignment, which I
analyze second, is in some ways the natural result of this moving target.
The legislative motors for dealing with trade law and policy are
selective-aggregating

and separating out potential trade-relevant

4. Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 154.
5. To be sure, Professor Meyer's Misalignment Thesis is not limited to trade. Importantly
for regulatory bodies and for legislators, the Misalignment Thesis applies likewise to legislative
bargaining struck over two or more interdependent policies. Under those circumstances, "the
policy that is subject to more frequent or costlier renegotiation and implementation will be
disfavored in the long run." Id. at 155. I consider here only the broader trade policy implications.
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topics. 6 Consequently, as noted by Professor Meyer, trade issues tend to
diverge in governance modality, instrument, and schedule. On the
latter question of time and dynamism in trade law, which I take up
third, trade policymaking struggles prospectively with responding to

dynamism in the global and national economies and retrospectively
with correcting issues arising in existing programs and institutions.

Each of these distinctions and qualities on its own may counsel
piecemeal reform rather than a review of trade law as a whole, but to
do so would be to the detriment of the larger trade law and policy
project. Indeed, one of the central lessons of this Response is that
policymakers' and scholars' inability to see trade law as a system is a
major part of the problem. In any reassessment, lawmakers ought not
to view the many aspects of trade policy in isolation, but rather ought
to consider how the various powers in the broad swath of trade
governance might substitute for each other or work together.
I. DEFINITIONS

To change trade lawmaking through a holistic review and reconsideration requires additional work defining and finding trade lawa not insignificant task. Trade is far more complex than just the
regulation of imports and exports. It has both international and
domestic components. 7 It addresses regulatory non-tariff barriers to
trade, as well as traditional tariff barriers.8 Trade rules encompass
aspects of environmental policy, food safety, human rights, and
intellectual property protections, among much more. 9 Lawmakers today
push far more content into "trade law" than would have been the case

6.
These decisions are often the products of political dynamics at the time of their
enactment rather than principled policymaking choices. For example, lawmakers faced a similar,
exceptional political situation in 2007, striking a bipartisan deal on certain sensitive trade-plus
issues. See generally Charles B. Rangel, Moving Forward: A New Bipartisan Trade Policy that
Reflects American Values, 45 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 377 (2008) (discussing the May 10, 2007, political
compromise regarding labor, intellectual property, and environmental provisions, among others,
in U.S. trade agreements).
7.
See Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 583, 586-97 (2019) (discussing competing domestic and international paradigms in
trade law).
8.
Commentators have used the "plus" suffix to capture concepts that go beyond
traditional trade agreement topics. Those commentators coin phrases like "GATT-plus" or "TRIPSplus." In prior work, I lump those together to use simply "trade-plus," though I am not the first to
use that expression as discussed therein. Kathleen Claussen, Reimagining Trade-Plus
Compliance: The Labor Story, 23 J. INT'L ECON. L. 25, 26 (2020).
9.
See, e.g., Simon Lester, The Role of the International Trade Regime in Global
Governance, 16 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 209, 211, 221-38, 260, 263 (2011) (providing an
overview of the expansion of trade agreements).
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a half century ago.1 0 But, as Professor Meyer shows, lawmakers also
push some topics out from the dominant trade liberalization laws.
This Part reviews the boundary drawing that we do in trade-in
the law, in practice, and in scholarship and commentary. It considers
which elements of trade law dominate those spaces and which remain
obscured. A full study of the expansion and contraction of trade law is
beyond the scope of this Response, but trade's changing and vague
perimeter is an underlying and overlooked element of the construction
of coherent and comprehensive law and policy. The circumscription of
trade law has led to a series of disjunctions that Part II will take up.
First, however, it is worth tracing the debates over how we define "trade
law" and, commensurately, where we find it (or not). Demarcating the
bounds of trade law is a challenge in both definition and location.
A. Finding Trade Law
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to collect
duties and to regulate foreign commerce," Congress has regularly
delegated some of that authority to the executive branch. Most familiar
is Congress's delegation to the president to change tariff rates, either
under particular factual circumstances or as part of a trade agreement
negotiation.1 2 Those delegations, and particularly those agreements,
perceived by many to make up the foundation of our trade law today,
have been the subject of considerable attention among scholars and
Congress for the last several decades. 13
By the middle of the twentieth century, governments began to
see trade as a vehicle for achieving multinational regulatory goals. With
that change, the idea of liberalization expanded beyond just tariff
authorities. International trade negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s
shifted attention from the reduction of traditional tariff barriers to the
10.
I describe how this has occurred in U.S. trade law in greater detail in forthcoming
work: Kathleen Claussen, Trade Administration, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter
Trade Administration].
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12.
See, e.g., Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320 [hereinafter TPA 2015] (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4210); see
also Cory Adkins & David Singh Grewal, Two Views of InternationalTrade in the Constitutional
Order, 94 TEx. L. REV. 1495, 1516 (2016); Trade Administration, supra note 10, at manuscript Part
I.
13. See, e.g., Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, et. al, U.S. Trade Policy Primer:Frequently Asked
SERV.,
R45148,
27
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R45148.pdf
Questions,
CONG.
RES.
[https://perma.c/A6BM-VEWQ] (last updated Jan. 29, 2019) (describing how U.S. trade policy is
premised on the delegation of certain powers to the president to negotiate trade agreements). In
fact, international trade law textbooks made for law school classes today tend to focus precisely on
what their titles suggest: the international framework where the rules of economic liberalization
are enacted and played out.
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elimination of "non-tariff barriers"-such as licensing requirements,
health and safety regulations, and other administrative measuresthat could be considered discriminatory to foreign business. Taken
together, expanding markets and the proliferation of cross-border
supply chains forced a dramatic change to the idea and practice of trade
law.14 These developments pushed trade out from a previously tarifffocused center into the far reaches of the administrative state. As a
result, what we consider to be "trade law" is also now applicable to and
produced in most regulatory areas.
A corollary of this expansion and the capaciousness of "trade" is
that areas of policy that were once siloed (or that did not exist) became
part of trade. Compare the "negotiating objectives" in trade promotion
legislation from 2015 where Congress lays out the subject areas that
any free trade agreement should cover with the same list of "negotiating
objectives" in earlier legislation.1 5 The 2015 legislation covers twentyone issue areas in the negotiating objectives ranging from "trade in
goods" to "anti-corruption." 16 "Tradification" ushered in a new form of
governance as the law became both a policy task and a policy limit
across a broad swath of agencies. 17 By one count, there are today fivehundred customs-related laws that are administered by forty-seven
agencies.18

Given this rapid and extensive expansion, trade law is now as
difficult to locate as to define. One might expect to find trade law in
Title 19 of the U.S. Code, named "Customs Duties," or Title 15, called
"Commerce and Trade," but those titles would be insufficient, and in
the case of the latter, surprisingly inaccurate. The U.S. House of
Representatives Ways and Means Committee staff has developed since
198719 a Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes ("Compilation")that could
be said to be a reasonably comprehensive collection of U.S. trade law,
14. See, e.g., Lester, supra note 9, at 211, 221-38 (providing an overview of the expansion
of trade agreements).
15. See, e.g., Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1101,
102 Stat. 1107, 1121-25 (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (2018)).
16. TPA 2015, supra note 12, § 102.
17. Trade Administration, supra note 10, manuscript at Part II.A.1.
18. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 113th Cong. 11,
18 (2014) (statement of Kevin K. McAleenan) https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=753146
[https://perma.cc/RQG3-ZKT2]. At least ten agencies are involved in trade monitoring and
enforcement alone. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON U.S. AGENCIES'
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 7-9 (2017).
19.
STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 100TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND

COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES III (Comm. Print 1987) (calling the Compilation a "more
complete working document" than the 1984 "Overview of Current Provisions of U.S. Trade Law"
that the Committee staff published in 1984 to serve as "a concise summary of the various statutory
provisions relating to foreign trade").
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although even that is incomplete in certain respects.2 0 A number of
interesting observations may be made about this Compilation,which is
comprised of seven chapters of trade-relevant topics. 2 1 Both with
respect to its internal and external use, the House Ways and Means
Committee staff critically arranges trade policy both in content and in
organization. One of the Compilation's most valuable contributions is
that it includes references to more than seventy different statutes, but
fewer than half are exclusively trade-related. Rather than just focus on
landmark tariff-changing acts, the Compilation pulls together all the
individual provisions of statutes related to other topics that include a
single provision of relevance to trade, such as Section 7 of the
Rhinoceros and Tiger Conservation Act of 1994.22

What the Compilation does not highlight, and what the lay
reader picking up the volume may miss, is that trade law has two
unusual features, and those features complicate its application as well
as its reform. First, unlike certain other areas where laws are regularly
repealed and replaced, in trade, Congress has adopted building-block
type statutes that either lightly amend or, more often, stand side-byside with past laws. Many aspects of U.S. trade law therefore consist of
minor modifications or institutional and programmatic supplements to
statutes that date back to the middle of the twentieth century, or even
earlier. These modifications and supplements are enacted in the form
of omnibus bills that include provisions dealing with a wide variety of
trade-related issues. 23 In this sense, U.S. trade law is highly modular. 24
20.

STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 113TH CONG., COMPILATION OF U.S.

TRADE STATUTES (Comm. Print 2013). For example, the Compilation does not include certain
executive agreements negotiated by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, like side letters
to trade agreements, among others. The transmittal letter notes that the compilation is "not meant
to be a comprehensive treatise of every trade-related law or program, nor does it cover provisions
to regulate domestic commerce." Id. at III.
21.
The chapters are "Tariff and customs laws"; "Trade remedy laws"; "Other laws
regulating imports"; "Preference Programs"; "Authorities relating to political or economic
security"; "Reciprocal trade agreements"; "Organization of trade policy functions"; and "Trade
Agreement Implementing Acts." Id. at V-XI.
22. Id. at VII.
23. The omnibus trade bills that have had the greatest impact on U.S. trade policy include
the Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 19 U.S.C.); Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-315, 48 Stat. 943 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); 1962 Act, supra note 3; and Trade Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. ch. 12).
24. For a study about the modularity of our trade lawmaking (although he does not use
that term) and why that matters, see Steve Charnovitz, Comment, Using Framework Statutes to
Facilitate U.S. Treatymaking, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 696, 696 (2004) (discussing the way the United
States implements trade law); see also Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799, 915 (1995) (arguing that the Trade Act of 1974, more than
other omnibus trade acts before it, had a constitutional effect, "creating new rules for the lawmaking system itself').
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The systems created through the omnibus acts, which are heavily
repetitive of their predecessors, are integrated instead through the
shared practice of trade law institutions.
The statutory modularity is only one part of our trade law
system, however, and among the easiest to identify. Considerable
volumes of trade law are made in largely unseen ways, through the
work of the executive branch alone, in the form of regulations and trade
executive agreements. 25 Administrative agencies engage in the exercise

of trade law and in its further development in their quotidian
interactions with foreign trading partners. Some of that activity is
directed by Congress, but not all. 26 In fact, Congress is often not aware
of those activities such as the conclusion by agencies of trade executive
agreements, negotiated agreements with trading partners organized

and implemented by the executive branch without congressional review
or approval. These are left out of the congressional Compilation and not
organized by any of the relevant trade governance actors. In the absence
of readily available public information about these agreements, they
remain obscured from discussion about trade law generally, except
perhaps among experts in the issue areas that they individually
implicate.27

With such broad contours to expand topics in trade agreements
and issues subject to trade rules and enforcement, and a lack of
transparency in certain specialized areas by lawmakers, the limits of
"trade law" as a field are easily blurred.
B. Trade-Claiming
The boundaries of trade law matter most in determining who or
what institution will oversee its application. "Trade-claiming"-my
term for the labeling of a policy area as "trade" or not-is significant
because viewing a subject as "trade" may determine which branch of
government has responsibility for its governance. The scope of what
counts as "trade" affects who manages it and under what terms. As
noted at the outset, the foreign commercial enterprise, at least as a
matter of constitutional law, falls under Congress's exclusive purview.
25. Trade Administration, supra note 10, manuscript at 27.
26. Id.
27. The lack ofvisibility is not limited to regulatory agreements. In some respects, support
for trade adjustment assistance may also be hampered by its hiddenness in liberalization
conversations. At the time it was decoupled, lawmakers likely underestimated its importance for
the reasons Professor Meyer explains: at that time, it was seen as a backstop, a second-best
alternative where trickle-down policies could not reach. See Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1,
at 157-58. As globalization continued, however, the need grew for legislation designed to ensure
an equitable distribution of the gains from liberalization.
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Congress may choose to delegate that authority, but Congress retains
the first and last word on its regulation. Trade-related issue areas that
could be said to fall outside that umbrella or that are otherwise subject
to competing claims of authority complicate that structure. Tradeclaiming also matters because what we think of today as "trade" is often
"free trade" or part of trade liberalization, but not exclusively so. As the
prior Section showed, some new regulatory areas are brought into the
fold of the liberalization project, while others remain outside or
unnoticed.
Policy topics now claimed as part of "trade" or "subject to trade"
rules including intellectual property, labor rules, and environmental
protection are domestic policy areas in which Congress regularly
legislates. And just like in trade, Congress regularly delegates those
responsibilities to the executive branch. But the line between
congressional and executive control becomes more difficult to identify
where those policy areas intersect with foreign negotiations or where
they have a connection with national defense and economic security. In
those latter areas, the executive branch regularly claims inherent
authority. 28 So claimed, Congress's power to discipline the executive's
activities through oversight mechanisms or ex post review diminishes
considerably.
At these policy crossroads, trade-claiming becomes more
important, but also more contested. The simple idea of trade governance
belonging to the legislative branch and other areas of foreign policy
belonging to the executive is muddied. This question is a matter of
ongoing scholarly debate and something on which the courts have
occasionally opined. 29 The labels and the groupings given to various
trade-related policies have meaningful impacts on how they are
institutionalized and, in turn, on their successful outcomes.
Professor Meyer's article brings us one step farther in
identifying precisely how trade-claiming matters. He demonstrates
that, when some pieces of the bargain are left out of legislative decisionmaking on the dominant policy (here, liberalization), not only may their
institutional governance structure shift, but they may also be subject to

28. See, e.g., Hearingon U.S.-China Trade: HearingBefore the Comm. on Ways andMeans,
116th Cong. 22 (2019) (testimony of Robert E. Lighthizer commenting on the executive proceeding
without congressional review on certain trade deals); Brief of Defendant, Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel,
Inc. v. United States, No. 2019-1727, at *29 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 18, 2019) ("In exercising his authority
under Section 232, the President is unquestionably operating in the realms of national security
and foreign trade . . . . The President's independent powers over national security and foreign
affairs mean that .. . all constitutional requirements are satisfied.")
29. See, e.g., Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 967925
(Fed. Cir. Feb. 28, 2020), petition for cert filed (Mar. 27, 2020).
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different rules and legislative treatment.3 0 In the case of trade
adjustment assistance, this separation has worked to the detriment of
free trade ideals more generally by diminishing the salience of
redistribution. Trade-claiming thus has not only constitutional and
governance dimensions, but it also creates reverberations throughout
the regulatory, fiscal, and international environments and the
normative elements of what trade policy for the United States ought to
look like.
II. DISJUNCTIONS

Apart from the challenges of defining and finding trade law, a
second related institutional flaw in our trade law system is that which
Professor Meyer highlights: misalignment and general disorganization
in trade policymaking. That our trade law system is disorderly may be
unsurprising given its haphazard growth and competitive governance

structure. A close study reveals multiple misalignments beyond just
that between trade liberalizing statutes and economic welfare statutes.
This Part looks at other disjunctions in trade law, especially those that
seem to clash with or be segregated from trade liberalization law and
policy. In these other instances, Professor Meyer's Misalignment Thesis
also holds true, even if manifested in slightly different ways. The
mitosis of trade-related policies creates alternative, competing chains
of command. In these other instances of misalignment, we observe a
range of divisions of responsibility between Congress and the executive
branch, and between international and domestic policy tools. Seen
together, these arrangements comprise a spectrum of approaches to

various aspects of trade law. Here, I will focus on just two additional
troubling misalignments with trade liberalization laws: first,
authorizations to the president to raise tariffs for reasons of economic
security, and, second, the integration of international labor provisions
into trade agreements.
Alongside trade liberalizing delegations enabling the president
to negotiate free trade agreements that lower barriers to trade,
Congress has also delegated authority that allows the executive to raise
tariffs under certain circumstances. This second set of tariffs enables
the executive to impose additional tariffs on goods at the U.S. border
when economic security so requires.3 1 Together, the two sets codify
30. See Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 216-20 (discussing applications of the
Misalignment Thesis).
31. Kathleen Claussen, Trade's Security Exceptionalism, 72 STAN. L. REV. (manuscript at
6) (forthcoming 2020) [hereinafter Trade's Security Exceptionalism].
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distinct approaches to trade-a primary tariff-lowering approach and a
secondary security-premised tariff-raising approach.

In prior work, Professor Meyer made the point that Congress has
retained different levels of control in assorted areas of trade delegations
to the executive. 32 Indeed, historically, Congress has asserted greater
control over tariff-reducing delegations than tariff-increasing
delegations. 33 Professor Meyer argues that these differential levels of
discipline incentivize the president to use tariff-raising authorities to
fulfill the president's domestic economic goals. 34 And it goes still
farther. Congressional review over tariff-raising delegations related to
economic security or economic burden is far less intensive than it is with
those related to trade liberalization, making the exceptional delegations
procedurally distinct, as well as substantively distinct. The differential
levels of discipline create a general misalignment in the legislative
bargain underestimated by policymakers and commentators until now.
Although both authorities-liberalizing and tariff-raising-are
delegated to the president, these two delegations are treated much like
the Misalignment Thesis would predict. They are interdependent in
that addressing one will have consequences that create demand for a
policy response to the other problem. They are now decoupled in
instrument and in practice: one in the form of standing statute, the
other in a renewable statute leading to an international instrument.
And, there is a lack of credible commitment to view them as linked in
any way-either as substituting for each other or as working togetherwhich is the element of this misalignment that is most dangerous to
trade governance and to traditional liberalization advocates. 35 Further,
the latter tariff-raising delegations are set apart from the liberalizing
delegation along the same dimensions as the market access and laborsupporting statutes are separated. While the liberalization
commitments are implemented by the executive, they are subject to
some congressional checks and memorialized in trade agreements. The
tariff-raising delegations, on the other hand, are implemented solely by
the executive and not codified in any international instrument. With
respect to the primary liberalizing delegations, Congress progressively

added more procedural constraints which I call "trade delegation
32. See Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency, 44 YALE J.
INT'L L. ONLINE 16, 17-18 (2019) [hereinafter Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency].
33.
See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen, Separation of Trade Law Powers, 43 YALE J. INT'L L.
315, 333-39 (2018) [hereinafter Separation of Trade Law Powers].
34.
Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency, supra note 32, at 17.
35. The two authorities are substitutable as currently formed, but originally they were
intended for similar policy outcomes. Trade's Security Exceptionalism, supra note 31, at
manuscript 7.
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disciplines."3 6 In contrast, Congress did little to nothing to control
presidential action with respect to the tariff-raising delegations which
were considered exceptions to the primary liberalization policy. The
exceptions were left unchecked as they were not a part of what was seen
as the main trade law program. Both sets of delegations carve out a
space for executive action, but one does so in a bounded way while the
other does not. This divergence in oversight reinforces the perception
that free trade and economic security are in contrast with one another.
Taken together, the misalignment between tariff-raising and tarifflowering authorities has permitted the Trump Administration to apply
the exceptions as the centerpiece of its trade policy.
As in the case of the economic welfare misalignment, this
disjunction in trade policy has serious risks and high stakes. First,
under the present system, the president could convert the exceptional
tariff-raising opportunities to the rule or to the primary tool for trade
policy. Second, the misalignment creates more friction among the
branches in an area already fraught with sensitivities. Third, there is
a danger that a system with such a clear path of least resistance toward
increased control could precipitate a greater transfer of authority to the
president or political paralysis. It should come as no surprise that
presidents would take advantage of those authorities where the
threshold to access is low. Finally, underlying many of the
abovementioned concerns is a more general risk that an exception
without sufficient discipline could lead to abuse.
Like in other areas of trade lawmaking, a status quo bias
appears to explain the reinforced misalignment between the
exceptional delegations and the liberalizing delegations. 37 Paths
designed early in the development of modern U.S. trade law have
tended to be followed throughout the law's development. In the case of
the security and liberalizing delegations, the legislative history shows
this neglect may have contributed to misunderstandings in their
meaning and purposes, and ultimately to different types of
applications. 38

We might also consider an additional misalignment that arises
with respect to liberalization and labor. Labor rules in trade
agreements, and particularly the enforcement of those rules, have been
at the center of debates on new trade agreements. 39 Professor Meyer
36. Id. at manuscript 7.
37. See Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 186; Separation of Trade Law Powers,
supra note 33, at 347.
38. Trade's Security Exceptionalism, supra note 31, at manuscript 56.
39.
See, e.g., Jude Webber, James Politi, & Mamta Badkar, Mexico and US Settle Row
Ouer
USMCA
Labour
Enforcement,
FIN.
TIMES,
(Dec.
16,
2019)
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discusses how labor enforcement was part of the market access-trade
adjustment assistance bargain. 40 A further political bargaining exercise
continues with respect to international labor rules which remain
integral parts of trade agreements and part of the liberalization
understanding. Indeed, the final agreement and implementation of the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, the successor to the North
American Free Trade Agreement, was delayed while a new round of
negotiations, instigated by Democrats in the House of Representatives,
could occur to address international labor issues.41 Thus, in one sense,
after trade adjustment assistance addressing domestic labor concerns
had been removed from trade agreements, international labor came
in-and became central to the bargain. In the absence of any
enforceable multilateral agreements on labor rules, policymakers
integrated labor into unilateral, bilateral, and regional trade
instruments.4 2 This integration came from above and below; civil society
and government actors forced this change. Throughout the legal
universe, the nature of these labor commitments is to freeze domestic
labor standards at an agreed threshold. They act as "standstill"
provisions that preserve the status quo on labor in the domestic legal
system of the countries involved. Somewhat ironically, however, since
domestic labor issues had already been decoupled, international labor
and domestic labor issues remain misaligned in trade policy.
To be sure, my criticism of the several misalignments in trade
law is not an argument to legislate all trade issues together. To do so
would be practically impossible, if not also politically so. But
misalignment is different from a principled division of responsibility
with regular accommodation in the legislative process. It is also
different from a comprehensive review that permits thoughtful
segregation of certain areas of trade lawmaking. The concern
motivating this project is that certain disjunctions in U.S. trade law
create instability and precipitate other unanticipated harms. In certain
instances, in the absence of interlocking demands, for example,
https://www.ft.com/content/013a7816-2039-11ea-92da-f0c92e957a96
[https://perma.cc/9WG4LXKQ].
40. Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 209.
41. See Beth Baltzan & Jeffrey Kucik, NAFTA's Replacement Giues Labor Some Shelter
from
Globalization's
Storms,
FOREIGN
POL'Y,
(Jan.
16,
2020)
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/usmca-mexico-canada-trump-workers-democrats-naftasreplacement-gives-labor-some-shelter-from-globalizations-storms/ [https://perma.cc/C79C-TQ48].
42.
Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for
Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 151, n.61 and accompanying text (1992) (discussing FrenchItalian accords of the early twentieth century; Hispaniola; Social Charter of the European
Community; efforts toward a working group on labor standards in various rounds of negotiation
toward the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
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desirable. Take export controls, for example. The United States
restricts the export of defense articles, dual-use goods and technology,
and other items related to the defense industrial base. 43 While these
programs are commercial in nature, they are also dominated by defense
and foreign policy considerations. The export control system is largely
regulated by its own set of statutes, some of which implement
international commitments. 44 These statutes do not fall in the same
category of troubling decoupled-from-free-trade policies for reasons
Professor Meyer sets out: they are not interdependent in their
implementation.4 5 We subject these different systems to different
controls and renew them at different times without difficulties. The
entirety of trade in one legislative instrument would surely be too
unwieldy, but at least some aspects of this line-drawing need to be
revisited.
III. DYNAMISM

Looking at trade law over the course of our nation's history as
Professor Meyer has done illuminates another troubling characteristic:
some aspects of trade law appear highly path dependent or even static,
while others are in a constant state of question and flux. 46 No obvious
principle distinguishes among them. Rather, temporal discrepancies
are found throughout trade law.
Temporary legislation, legislation that sets a date on which an
agency, regulation, or statutory scheme will terminate, is used
extensively in other areas of law. 47 In trade, however, it is not just the
use of temporary legislation, but rather multiple competing timelines
for complementary areas of trade policy, that obfuscate lawmaking. By
way of one example, Professor Meyer analyzes how the decoupling of
trade adjustment assistance from trade liberalization agreements
43.
IAN F. FERGUSSON & PAUL K. KERR, THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE
EXPORT
CONTROL
REFORM
INITIATIVE,
CONG.
RES.
SERV.
1
(Jan.
28,
2020)

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z84F-M98R].
44.
See, e.g., Katherine D. McManus & Harry R. Marshall, Jr., United States Nuclear
Export Controls, 4 FORDHAM J. INT'L L.J. 265, 266 (1980) (describing the implementation into U.S.
law of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
45. Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 181.
46. See id. at 172-73 (tracing trade law throughout the United States' history).
47. Jacob Gersen describes advantages of this approach: "From an informational
perspective, temporary legislation provides concrete advantages over its permanent cousin by
specifying windows of opportunity for policymakers to incorporate a greater quantity and quality
of information into legislative judgments. By redistributing the decision costs of producing
legislation, temporary measures also facilitate experimentation and adjustment in public policy."
Jacob Gersen, TemporaryLegislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 248, 255 (2007).
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beginning in 1962 subjected each policy to different renewal timelines
to the detriment of the former. 48 He describes how this temporal
distinction creates uncertainty in the continuity of the trade adjustment
assistance program and its financial security.4 9 This decoupling shifts
the timing of the trade adjustment assistance legislation out of step
from trade liberalization which then alters the nature of the legislative
bargain surrounding its renewal.
Consider other like patterns in trade lawmaking. For one, and
as also seen in the data presented by Professor Meyer, Congress
operates on different timelines when considering trade negotiating
authority than it does for trade adjustment assistance. Trade
negotiating authority in its modern form was first delegated in 1934
and renewed for short periods throughout the subsequent three
decades.5 0 Still today, Congress grants the president negotiating
authority in short windows, but those windows do not always align with
trade adjustment assistance. 51

Second, and again consistent with Professor Meyer's expos6, the
executive branch's negotiating authority expires, but not the negotiated
agreements. Those agreements are approved by Congress and then
subject to execution and implementation by the executive branch with
little to no temporal oversight by Congress. 52 Trade executive
agreements likewise may be of unlimited duration. 53
Third, although certain trade programs like trade adjustment
assistance and the Generalized System of Preferences expire, not so the
agencies that are in place to administer such authority. 54 Congress puts
time limits on trade authorities but not on the institutions that
implement them. On the one hand, that this is so may entice those
48.
49.
50.

Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 157-58.
Id. at 158.
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-315, 48 Stat. 943 (codified

as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.); DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE

433-519 (2017).
51.
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. 4202(a)(1)(A); MisalignedLawmaking, supra note 1, at 175-76
(providing a chart).
52.
See Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 191 (discussing temporal elements of
agreements).
53.
To be sure, most treaties and statutes are like this, but rarely are these other
instruments the products of interdependent policies. The lack of a sunset or review clause is likely
an advantage for continuity in business and generally may be useful for trade law, but it has the
ancillary effect of further separating trade adjustment assistance from trade liberalization.
54.
VIVIAN C. JONES, GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP): OVERVIEW AND
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9, CONG. RES. SERV., Nov. 7, 2019. The difference in the success of
institutions is consistent with Professor Meyer's point that regulatory programs are distinct from
fiscal programs in the misalignment scenario. MisalignedLawmaking, supra note 1, at 194. It may
signal that institutionalization further contributes to this differential and that embeddedness
within an agency is a determining factor.
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institutions to develop practices that entrench those programsprograms that may have only had weak political support in the first
place. Such entrenchment might alleviate any concern about
misalignment. On the other hand, because most agencies administer
multiple programs, they could choose to treat misaligned programs in
disparate ways with uneven outcomes for program beneficiaries. By
disconnecting renewal of an agency from its program, executive or

administrative motivation has the potential to influence the latter's
continuation.

Fourth, Congress implemented an intricate trade remedies
program in the Trade Act of 1930.55 Since then, Congress has adjusted
the program occasionally in fractional respects, while trade
liberalization proceeded apace. Most of the rest of the 1930 Act was
superseded by subsequent trade lawmaking, but the trade remedies
program remains intact-and deeply institutionalized. Here we have an
example of a trade law program that continues without renewal or
reconsideration and that is intended to be responsive to and in service
of trade liberalization, which is regularly reviewed. 56 Like the securityliberalization misalignment, such an arrangement creates incentives
for agencies and other actors to use these disjunctions as leverage.
Fifth, while trade negotiating authority permitting the
president to negotiate mostly lower tariff rates with trading partners
requires congressional renewal, our delegated security exceptions and
other tariff-raising authorities do not expire. Within the omnibus trade
acts, authorities delegated to the president to raise tariffs have no time
limit, but those to liberalize are temporary delegations only. 57
These divergent timelines suggest that some programs and

principles of trade law have been locked in without need for additional
consideration, while others left unfixed must be regularly reconsidered.
They also suggest that the difference between those categories is
reasonably haphazard and arbitrary. Looking across the trade law
system and over time, one observes a normalization of liberalization as
a policy, but one also observes significant variation in what pieces get
55.
Act of June 5, 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-304, 46 Stat. 497.
56.
To be sure, this problem is not limited to interbranch temporal or substantive
divisions. Fragmentation within the executive branch itself, as highlighted also in Part I of this
Response, contributes to the temporal discrepancy difficulty. Professor Meyer has contemplated a
solution in separate writing: Timothy Meyer & Ganesh Sitaraman, It's Economic Strategy, Stupid:
The Case for a Department of Economic Growth and Security, 3 AM. AFF. 1 (2019)
https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/its-economic-strategy-stupid/
[https://perma.cc/AL8DHQKV].
57. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (not limiting the years to which the tariff-raising authority
applies), with 19 U.S.C. § 4202(a)(1)(A) (only allowing the president to negotiate free trade
agreements before July 1, 2018, or July 1, 2021, if authorities are extended).
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normalized or secured. In the present political environment,
policymakers have a reasonable expectation of trade promotion
authority to negotiate trade agreements. But it was not always that
way. As noted above, negotiating authority was not so automatic; it was
tied to a short congressional leash until such time as support for
liberalization was secured on a broader scale. 58 Trade adjustment
assistance has not benefitted from the same degree of reliability-at
least not yet.
There is far more to trade's intertemporality than can be
explored in this short Response. More work is needed to understand
broadly the temporal features of trade lawmaking. Professor Meyer lays
the foundation for this work. 59 He notes that lawmakers often revisit
laws in light of new information or to renegotiate the distribution of
costs and benefits, but they do so after having established ex ante the
terms under which renegotiation occurs.6 0 That much is undoubtedly
true, though trade law's iterativeness is uneven, as this Part
demonstrates.
In revealing this difficulty, Professor Meyer again highlights one
manifestation of a larger problem with trade law in the United States:
its inability to respond well to economic change considering the various
competing statutory timelines at work. The question of time as it relates
to trade institutions' ability to react to developments in the global
marketplace is a major issue of institutional design to be revisited. Our
present dependence on original bargaining or unique political moments

would appear to put more pressure on lawmakers in the first instance.
But trade law also exhibits a great deal of experimentation, and with
that, potential for redesign and reconsideration.
CONCLUSION

To resolve this detrimental configuration and create stability in
trade lawmaking, Professor Meyer maintains that misaligned trade
policies need to be subject to legislative renegotiation on the same
timeline and implemented on the same terms. 6 1 If possible, such a
relinking could prove a significant improvement in trade institutional
design. Certainly, viewing these areas as siloed is not productive. It
generates perverse legal and political incentives. As a practical matter,

however, the difficulty of refraining should not be understated.
58.
59.
60.
61.

IRwIN, supra note 50, at 433-519.
Misaligned Lawmaking, supra note 1, at 181.
Id.
Id. at 206-15.
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MisalignedLawmaking elucidates helpfully a phenomenon that,
now identified, can be seen to pose an acute danger to trade law's
precarious footing. Ultimately, scholars have paid insufficient attention
to how to think about trade law outside the primary trade law
liberalization norm. Seeing trade law and policy as a mutually
reinforcing and singular system would be a good first step. At this
critical juncture, Professor Meyer's thought-provoking contribution
advances the conversation toward a corrective, productive future.

